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One Lantern in the Darkest Night - The CIA's Inspector General
Abstract
Whether related to attempted assassinations, unauthorized interrogations, or other intelligence failures, the
Inspector General at the Central Intelligence Agency is supposed to conduct audits and internal investigations
into potential wrongdoing at an organization that operates in the shadows. From 1947 until 1990, the IG
served at the discretion of the Director of the CIA. Congress, after uncovering the CIA’s improper role in Iran-
contra, created a statutory IG. A new IG, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, was granted
the power to initiate investigations on his own and was required to make reports to the oversight committees
on problems within the Agency and on disputes between the IG and the Director. Through a more
independent IG, Congress sought more effective oversight of Agency activities as well as greater access to the
CIA’s inner dealings. This Article, part of a broader project that analyzes internal checks on the intelligence
community, reviews the IG’s statutory structure, compares the performance of the office on several
investigations before 1990 to its performance since then, and discusses the backgrounds and experiences of a
handful of officers who have served as the CIA’s watchdog. We question whether the changes in the IG’s
structure have really improved that office’s ability to keep the CIA on the right side of the law. Institutional
lapses have gone uncorrected. Individual responsibility has not been assigned for operational and strategic
failures. And, in many cases, journalists have scooped the IG.
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One Lantern in the Darkest Night: 
The CIA’s Inspector General 
Ryan M. Check* & Afsheen John Radsan** 
INTRODUCTION 
Tensions between secrecy and democracy can be reduced, but never 
completely resolved.  That is reality for the Central Intelligence Agency and 
for other intelligence services that seek to function within the rule of law.  
Gathering intelligence and conducting covert action, by their nature, depend 
on secrecy.  Foreign agents and foreign intelligence services rarely 
cooperate with our country unless we promise to protect them from public 
scrutiny.  Our word matters.  No spy wants his government to discover that 
he is a traitor, and few governments want their people to know how much 
they help the American empire.  Secrecy, however, erodes accountability.  
The CIA, operating in the shadows, is quite different from the Department 
of Labor. 
For the Agency, the methods for reducing tension between secrecy and 
democracy can generally be divided between the external and the internal.  
Those who track the media, Congress, and the courts analyze the external 
checks.  In this article, we analyze the internal checks.  This article builds 
on a prior one discussing the CIA’s Office of General Counsel,1 and it will 
be followed by a third article examining the boards and panels within the 
CIA’s National Clandestine Service.  Here, we focus on the CIA’s Office of 
Inspector General (OIG).2 
Does OIG really keep CIA officers honest and competent?  Can the 
new Director of the CIA (DCIA) depend on OIG in any way to make sure 
CIA officers do not torture suspected terrorists?  These questions, renewed 
from the Church Committee and the Iran-Contra investigations into prior 
abuses, serve as our core. 
Many scenarios of internal accountability at the CIA are mundane.  
Despite advances in financial transfer technology, espionage continues to 
 
 * Associate General Counsel, Virtual Radiologic Corporation. 
 ** Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law; Assistant General Counsel at 
the Central Intelligence Agency from 2002 until 2004.  The authors thank former Inspectors 
General Fred Hitz and Britt Snider for insights and helpful comments, as well as Professor 
Stephen Dycus and the participants in the University of Texas’s faculty workshop held at the 
Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law on March 12-13, 2009. 
 1. See A. John Radsan, Sed Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes: The CIA’s Office of 
General Counsel, 2 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 201 (2008); see also Daniel B. Silver, 
The Uses and Misuses of Intelligence Oversight, 11 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 7, 13-14 (1988). 
 2. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most 
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L. J. 2314 (2006) (offering another perspective on 
internal checks on executive power). 
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be a cash business.  As much as OIG insists on receipts and proper 
documentation during operations, people from headquarters are rarely in the 
field when a case officer pays a spy for services.  Little more than a 
personal code prevents the case officer from siphoning funds for himself. 
Other problems are more dramatic.  American policy makers may have 
decided, on their own, that a foreign country’s development of nuclear 
weapons poses a grave threat.  CIA analysts, faced with the President’s 
fixed view of the world, may discount and ignore data that contradict the 
policy makers.  Other analysts – who disagree with the President’s view – 
may discount or ignore data that contradict their own view of the world.  As 
an internal guard, OIG may not be able to do anything until it is too late, 
until the money is gone, or until a war has been started on false 
assumptions.  So whether it relates to interrogators, case officers, or 
analysts, from the mundane to the dramatic, OIG has a difficult task in 
attempting to keep people at the CIA on the right side of the line. 
After a joint inquiry into 9/11, Congress asked OIG to determine 
whether the CIA officers in charge before and on 9/11 should be “held 
accountable for failure to perform their responsibilities in a satisfactory 
manner.”3  OIG, not swayed by George Tenet’s justifications, said that the 
long-serving Director of Central Intelligence had failed to put in place an 
effective counterterrorism plan before 9/11.  Tenet, it seemed, deserved less 
than the medal that President Bush put around his neck upon retirement. 
For additional oversight, OIG recommended an Accountability Board 
to dig deeper into examining the competence of certain officers and units 
within the CIA.  But it is not clear whether such a Board will be created, 
whether any current or retired CIA officers will be taken to task, or whether 
OIG serves as a significant check on spymasters and analysts who conduct 
the bulk of their work on the dark side of American foreign policy. 
We strive here to offer more data than theories.  For those who would 
prefer a more theoretical approach, several themes do emerge.  First, data 
show a complicated interplay among external and internal checks on the 
CIA, oscillating and vibrating, one affecting the other in a wide and 
intricate web.  Second, OIG reinforces external checks, particularly those 
from Congress.  OIG, for example, may cause the intelligence committees 
to hold hearings.  Third, by keeping in touch with lawyers and intelligence 
officers in other parts of the CIA, OIG reinforces other internal checks.  
These checks are quite important when the same political party controls the 
executive and legislative branches.  The internal guardians in the 
bureaucracy, whatever the weather, tend to sway in the political winds less 
than elected officials do.  Fourth, contrary to other themes, senior officials 
 
 3. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, OIG REPORT ON CIA ACCOUNTABILITY WITH 
RESPECT TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS v (2005) [hereinafter OIG 9/11 Report], available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/Executive%20Summary_OIG%20Report.pdf.  Although 
OIG completed its report in the summer of 2005, the report was not released until the 
summer of 2007 – and then, only its executive summary. 
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at the CIA sometimes use an OIG investigation to fend off other checks, 
offering one safeguard to substitute for others. 
To explore these themes, we organize our inquiry into five sections.  In 
the first section, we review the role of inspectors general (IGs) across the 
government.  In the second, we set forth the history of the statutory IG. 
Third, we analyze rules affecting the CIA’s OIG – given that the statutory 
IG,4 appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
has greater potential for oversight than the non-statutory IG as a result of a 
dual reporting line to the Director of the CIA and the oversight committees 
in Congress.  In the fourth section, we present biographies of various IGs at 
the CIA, examining the educational backgrounds and professional 
experiences of the people who served in OIG, spanning the office’s 
statutory and pre-statutory periods.  In the fifth section, we assess various 
investigations OIG has conducted both before the statute and after.  Finally, 
by way of synthesis and conclusion, we suggest how OIG can provide 
better oversight. 
We believe OIG can provide a better internal check than the lawyers 
and the review boards at the CIA.  OIG is the mother of all guardians.  If 
OIG fails to provide a true check, the taxpayers and our democracy pay the 
price. 
I.  THE ROLE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL 
A.  Go Forth and Multiply 
The role of an IG as an internal investigator and an overseer within the 
executive branch dates as far back as General George Washington’s 
Continental Army.5  But the IG’s current incarnation traces to the Billy Sol 
Estes scandal at the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).6  A 1962 
USDA investigation found that Estes had created a “financial empire” by 
providing false statements and misinformation to various USDA 
 
 4. The general phrase “statutory IG,” when used in this article, refers to the CIA’s 
statutory IG.  Additionally, when the terms “IG” or “OIG” are used to refer to the CIA’s IG 
or the CIA’s Office of the Inspector General, they refer to the CIA’s statutory IG (or OIG), 
unless otherwise noted. 
 5. Baron Frederick von Steuben served as General George Washington’s Inspector 
General for the Continental Army.  William S. Fields & Thomas E. Robinson, Legal and 
Functional Influences on the Objectivity of the Inspector General Audit Process, 2 GEO. 
MASON INDEP. L. REV. 97, 99 (1993).  The Continental Congress created the position in 
response to scandals in the army, finding that a chief inspector/investigator was essential to 
promote discipline and to address the numerous abuses that had occurred within the army.  
PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR 
ACCOUNTABILITY 25 (1993). 
 6. Fields & Robinson, supra note 5, at 101.  An investigator on the Estes scandal 
stated that if Estes had not given birth to the IG concept, he should at least be considered its 
“midwife.”  Id. at 101-102. 
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departments to defraud the USDA’s cotton allotment system.7  The Estes 
investigation revealed that the USDA’s audit and investigative capabilities 
were inadequate, and that better-coordinated investigations would have 
uncovered the fraudulent activities much sooner.8  As a result of the outcry, 
Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman created the first modern IG to 
unify USDA’s efforts against internal waste and fraud.9 
Following Secretary Freeman’s creation of an IG at the USDA, changes 
in the political landscape brought the IG into wider use throughout the 
federal government.  During the 1960s and 1970s, congressional 
committees and staffs grew significantly, and members of Congress spent 
more time on oversight of executive agencies.10  This trend, as well as 
congressional struggles with the executive branch after Watergate, whetted 
Congress’s appetite for information about executive agencies.11  Congress 
focused on newly created programs in the 1960s, and in the 1970s and 
1980s turned to making existing programs less wasteful.12  The confluence 
of Congress’s hunger for information and the public’s interest in paring 
governmental waste led to the congressionally created IGs of the 1970s and 
1980s.13  These IGs became the only executive employees who reported to 
Congress without going through the Office of Management and Budget.14 
B.  Straddling the Barbed Wire Fence 
The Inspector General Act of 1978 created thirteen statutory IGs for 
executive departments, and after various other statutes of the 1980s, there 
were a total of twenty-seven statutory IGs and thirty-four non-statutory IGs 
that possessed a unique combination of duties and responsibilities.15  The 
statutory scheme consolidated in the IGs the audit and investigative powers 
previously scattered across the federal government.16  When these functions 
were separate, neither audits nor investigations functioned well.17  To 
 
 7. Id. at 101. 
 8. Id.  The information necessary to a proper investigation was not even available, in 
part, because, as the size of the government rapidly expanded after the New Deal, the audit 
capacity of the Governmental Accounting Office and similar organizations had not kept 
pace.  Id. at 100. 
 9. LIGHT, supra note 5, at 31. 
 10. See id. at 51-57. 
 11. See id. at 48-51. 
 12. Id. at 45. 
 13. Id. at 24-25. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 25-26. 
 16. Id. at 2.  The IG focuses on investigating non-criminal conduct, as criminal 
investigations usually need to be forwarded to the Department of Justice.  Dan W. Reicher, 
Conflicts of Interest in Inspector General, Justice Department, and Special Prosecutor 
Investigations of Agency Heads, 35 STAN. L. REV. 975, 984 (1983). 
 17. Fields & Robinson, supra note 5, at 104.  This combination has been described as 
providing a “police patrol” (auditing) and a “fire alarm” (investigations).  LIGHT, supra note 
2010] THE CIA’S INSPECTOR GENERAL   251 
 
protect the IGs from politics, Congress installed several safeguards: (1) IG 
appointments must be made without regard to political affiliation; (2) the 
IG must be given free access to all necessary internal records and 
information; and (3) the IG must issue both regular and special reports.18  
Moreover, OIG – the organization that implements the IG’s auditing and 
investigatory policies – can only monitor its agency’s activities and has no 
power to act directly on its findings.19  Since the IG is not permitted to have 
any operational controls, he or she is left to persuade management to adopt 
OIG findings or recommendations.20 
Even so, the IG is often placed in difficult and conflicted positions.  Not 
long after the passage of the IG Act of 1978, IGs serving under President 
Reagan learned that the best way to attract support and attention was to 
uncover significant waste or abuse.  Those IGs who did not succeed in 
making headlines were often ignored or fired.21  But when the IG discovers 
problems within an agency – especially when those problems lead back to 
the agency’s senior management – the discoveries strain the relationship 
with the head of the agency, a relationship that is vital to the IG’s 
effectiveness.22  The challenge of providing a check that suits Congress, 
while not offending the agency, led former State Department IG Sherman 
Funk to describe the balancing act as “straddling the barbed wire fence.”23 
C.  A Special Case for Internal Checks 
The CIA describes its mission as being the “the nation’s first line of 
defense” – a mission accomplished not only by collecting and analyzing 
intelligence, but by “conducting covert action at the direction of the 
President to preempt threats or achieve US policy objectives.”24  Other 
agencies have different missions.  For example, when the USDA operates 
ineffective programs or violates the law, the scandals are likely to be 
 
5, at 42. 
 18. LIGHT, supra note 5, at 23-24. 
 19. Id. at 16.  The IG has been compared to a baseball umpire, “who call[s] balls and 
strikes, without concern for the final score of a game.”  Craig A. Meredith, The Inspector 
General System, ARMY LAW, July-Aug. 2003, at 20, 21. 
 20. LIGHT, supra note 5, at 17, 75. 
 21. Id. at 104-105. 
 22. See Reicher, supra note 16, at 985-986.  An IG who develops a close relationship 
with the agency head may not be in the position to conduct an impartial investigation of that 
person, further reducing effectiveness.  Id. 
 23. LIGHT, supra note 5, at 69. 
 24. Cia.gov, CIA Vision, Mission & Values, https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/cia-vision-
mission-values/index.html.  The CIA derives its power, in part, from the National Security 
Act of 1947, which permits the Agency to perform “such other functions and duties related 
to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or the National Security 
Council may direct.”  National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. §403-3(d)(5) (2006).  See 
generally 50 U.S.C. §§403 to 403–5. 
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contained within the borders of our country and the losses confined to the 
national treasury.25  By contrast, when the CIA faces problems, they are 
likely to implicate our national security, to affect our relations with other 
countries, and to put lives at risk. 
Publicized incidents of failures and abuses at the CIA demonstrate their 
profound consequences.  The Agency’s inability to police itself cost the 
lives of several Americans and crippled American intelligence in the Soviet 
bloc after Aldrich Ames sold CIA secrets to the KGB.26  CIA officers, in 
off-the-books operations, not only allowed a Guatemalan source to be 
linked to the killing of an American citizen,27 but connected the CIA to 
Nicaraguan guerillas who appeared deeply involved in drug trafficking.28  
The CIA failed to detect the terrorists who conducted the 9/11 attacks,29 
which in turn resulted in the disappearances of detainees and suffocations 
by sleeping bag,30 excesses now associated with the CIA under George W. 
Bush. 
CIA officers and agents are trained to run secret operations in hostile 
territory, to evade detection by highly skilled counterespionage forces, and 
to protect secrets at all costs.  In many cases of abuse, the facts took years 
to surface.  How then can our government ensure that the operatives who 
conduct missions in the shadows are doing so under the rule of law?  And 
when operators conceal their errors and abuses, how can others without 
operational training discover them? 
The question of how best to control shadow warriors has nagged 
Congress.  Incidents such as the CHAOS program31 demonstrated the limits 
of oversight that came from outside the CIA.  Without access to the inner 
workings of the Agency, Congress is oblivious to problems within the 
Agency, and may be stonewalled when it does uncover errors or abuses.  
Despite these incidents, Congress did not place substantial checks on the 
CIA before the Iran-Contra scandal. 
Congress’s Iran-Contra investigation revealed the CIA’s involvement, 
contrary to a congressional ban, in the financing, training, and supplying of 
opponents of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.32  In response to the 
 
 25. See, e.g., supra Part I.A. 
 26. See infra Part V.C.1. 
 27. See infra Part V.C.2. 
 28. See infra Part V.C.3. 
 29. See infra Part V.C.4. 
 30. See infra Part V.C.5. 
 31. See generally REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES 
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 130-150 (1975) [hereinafter Rockefeller Report], available at 
http://history-matters.com/archive/church/rockcomm/contents.htm.  The Rockefeller Report 
documented how in the late 1960s, under a program called “Operation CHAOS,” the CIA 
conducted surveillance on American citizens and organizations involved in Vietnam War 
protests.  The government’s rationale for involving the CIA in this operation was its fear that 
the protests were connected to foreign powers or governments.  Id. 
 32. See LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR 
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scandal, Congress required greater oversight of the CIA and the intelligence 
community, particularly independent internal oversight.  Following months 
of congressional investigations, thousands of pages of congressional 
reports, and nearly two years of conflict between the White House and 
Congress, the most notable change, for our purposes, was a statute that 
created an independent CIA inspector general. 
The problem with a non-statutory IG is perhaps best illustrated through 
an anecdote.  Floyd Paseman, who had a long career in the CIA’s 
clandestine service, recounts an experience with the original version of the 
IG.  Paseman suspected that his boss, the chief of station, had 
misappropriated government furniture and other property from prior tours.  
Seeking to do the right thing, Paseman met in private with the IG, who 
happened to be conducting an inspection in the field.  Paseman, of course, 
expected his conversation with the IG to remain confidential.  But Paseman 
soon learned, after immediate recriminations from his boss, that the IG and 
his boss were close friends from prior assignments.  Paseman was thus a 
victim of the old boys’ network at the CIA.  “I never again trusted an IG 
investigation,” Paseman states, “until the inspector general position became 
presidentially appointed and congressionally approved.”33 
II.  HISTORY OF THE STATUTORY IG 
The path to a statutory IG at the CIA was far more circuitous than at 
any other agency.34  President Ford’s Commission on CIA Activities within 
the United States (the Rockefeller Commission) recommended 
strengthening the Agency’s IG to guard against CIA abuses and excesses, 
including the CHAOS program.35  While the recommendation came in the 
1970s, when momentum was gathering for greater congressional 
oversight,36 it was never instituted.37  In fact, it was not until the executive-
legislative sparring over Iran-Contra – a decade later – that the statutory IG 
gained sufficient support to become a reality at the CIA.38 
The majority report for the Iran-Contra committee proposed a bill 
requiring that the CIA IG be a statutory position, subject to Senate 
 
IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS (1993) (providing an overview of the Iran-Contra scandal), 
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/. 
 33. FLOYD PASEMAN, A SPY’S JOURNEY: A CIA MEMOIR 80 (2004). 
 34. While Congress faced dissension from the executive branch when creating the 
initial group of statutory IGs who reported to Congress independently, the passage of the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 was far less eventful.  LIGHT, supra note 5, at 39. 
 35. Rockefeller Report, supra note 31, at 88-89.  See supra note 31 for further 
discussion on the CHAOS program. 
 36. See supra Part I.A. 
 37. LIGHT, supra note 5, at 35. 
 38. See WALSH, supra note 32. 
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confirmation.39  While the CIA’s internal investigation, led by a non-
statutory OIG, contributed to Congress’s Tower Board investigation of 
Iran-Contra,40 the committee believed OIG lacked the “manpower, 
resources or tenacity” to discover key facts uncovered by other 
investigations.41  Almost immediately, the Reagan administration opposed 
the Iran-Contra recommendation through the congressional testimony of 
then-Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William H. Webster.42  DCI 
Webster asked Congress for an opportunity to show that proper oversight 
could be accomplished with a non-statutory IG.43  Rather than force a 
statutory IG on the CIA, Senator Arlen Specter, one of the bill’s leading 
proponents and a Republican at the time, compromised with DCI Webster: 
Senator Specter withheld his statutory IG bill in exchange for DCI 
Webster’s promise to provide semiannual reports to Congress on the IG’s 
activities.44 
After the Specter-Webster compromise, tensions between the CIA and 
Congress subsided.  But DCI Webster soon fell short in fulfilling his end of 
the bargain.  Members of Congress said that his first report was 
inadequate.45 They continued to complain that his second report did not 
disclose all IG reports during the previous six months.46  Adding to the 
tensions, the House Intelligence Committee made multiple requests to the 
CIA for a list of all IG reports and for full IG reports of selected 
investigations.47  DCI Webster initially refused the requests, saying that 
Congress could not have direct access to the IG reports.  Later, he softened 
to allow partial access.48  By that time, the CIA’s overall lack of cooperation 
prompted Representative David McCurdy, chairman of the House 
intelligence subcommittee and a Democrat, to amend the 1990 intelligence 
authorization bill to require the DCI to provide the intelligence committees 
with a complete list of all IG reports, and to turn over any reports the 
 
 39. Iran-Contra Report; Arms, Hostages and Contras: How a Secret Foreign Policy 
Unraveled, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1987, at A12. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Richard L. Berke, Curbs on C.I.A. Said Opposed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1987, at 
A4.  Although Webster’s testimony was given at a closed hearing of the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, the committee’s staff director confirmed that Webster had 
testified for the Reagan administration against the proposed statutory IG. 
 43. See Stephen Engelberg, Iran-Contra Aside, Webster Asks for Trust, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 3, 1988, at A4. 
 44. Walter Pincus, CIA Chief Criticized over Reports, WASH. POST, July 15, 1989, at 
A7. 
 45. Walter Pincus, CIA Chief Fights Congress on Access to Documents, WASH. POST, 
July 14, 1989, at A4. 
 46. Pincus, supra note 44. 
 47. Pincus, supra note 45. 
 48. Id. First, DCI Webster only allowed the subcommittee chairman and part of his 
staff to view the reports without taking notes; later the DCI allowed them to take notes. 
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committees requested.49  Step by step, tensions increased between Congress 
and the executive branch, the former pointing to its power of the purse, the 
latter referring to its prerogative to keep the secrets necessary to run 
diplomatic, military, and intelligence activities. 
In response to the McCurdy amendment, DCI Webster, in a July 10, 
1989 letter to each committee member, argued that being required to submit 
reports to the committee could cause CIA employees to be less forthcoming 
in IG investigations and could undermine the integrity of the inspection 
process.50  DCI Webster spoke of maintaining the “principles of comity and 
mutual respect” that had governed the relationship between the CIA and 
Congress since Iran-Contra.51  But in describing the McCurdy amendment 
as “unnecessary, unwise, and not well thought out,” DCI Webster’s letter 
caused further tension.52  Representative Elmer “Bud” Shuster, the ranking 
Republican on the subcommittee, characterized DCI Webster’s refusal to 
heed the subcommittee’s requests for IG reports as a “serious mistake,” and 
cautioned that DCI Webster was “inviting much more stringent scrutiny by 
his knee-jerk opposition.”53 
Representative Shuster’s words proved prescient.  Senator Specter 
reacted to DCI Webster’s letter by announcing on July 14, 1989 that he was 
resurrecting his proposal to establish the CIA’s IG as a statutory position.54  
An intelligence conference committee adopted both the Specter and 
McCurdy amendments to the 1990 intelligence authorization bill on 
November 16, 1989.55  On November 30, 1989, over loud protests from DCI 
Webster, President Bush signed the measure into law.56 
 
 49. Id. The amendment, co-sponsored by the ranking Republican member of the 
committee, Rep. Bud Shuster of Pennsylvania, was approved unanimously by the 
committee. 
 50. Id. Upon receiving Webster’s letter, Rep. McCurdy retorted that “it is up to 
Congress, which authorizes and appropriates the CIA’s funds, to determine what is or is not 
relevant to congressional oversight of the intelligence community – not the CIA.” 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. Besides the terseness of DCI Webster’s opposition to the amendment, 
committee members were frustrated that Webster’s means of delivering his message – an 
unclassified letter, hand-delivered to each committee member – “all but guaranteed [the 
letter] would become public.”  Id.  According to The Washington Post, another committee 
member (identity withheld) opined that Webster’s stance was consistent with that of “CIA 
officials who ‘want to treat [congressmen] like mushrooms,’ which thrive when kept in the 
dark and buried in manure.”  Pincus, supra note 44. 
 53. Pincus, supra note 44. 
 54. Id. 
 55. David B. Ottaway & Walter Pincus, Panel Drops Reforms on Covert Operations, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1989, at A58. 
 56. Id. 
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III.  THE IG’S STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
A.  Introduction 
Before 1990, the DCI57 held the power to appoint and remove the CIA’s 
inspector general.58  But after the failings of the CIA’s OIG during Iran-
Contra, Congress reacted to what it perceived as OIG’s structural 
shortcomings.59  Creation of a statutory IG under 50 U.S.C. Section 403q 
(hereinafter referred to as “the IG statute”) was intended to achieve two 
main objectives: (1) to ensure independence and effectiveness of OIG in the 
exercise of its audit and investigatory powers; and (2) to keep the DCIA 
and the intelligence committees informed about CIA problems and the 
progress of remedial actions.60  To do these things, Congress chose a 
peculiar blend of independence, cooperation, and, at times, confrontation. 
Today, the IG has a staff of professionals, including a legal adviser who 
is separate from the Office of General Counsel (OGC).  Not as large as 
OGC, OIG tends to draw on insiders from the intelligence community.  
Unlike OGC, OIG does not have a core of honors attorneys and lateral hires 
to bring fresh perspectives from law school, clerkships, and other jobs.  As 
necessary, the OIG staff includes experts in accounting and computers.  
Some staff members are analysts and case officers who left their divisions 
to help keep former colleagues in line.  More distinct as an internal guard, 
OIG seems even less popular at headquarters than OGC, its staff less likely 
than OGC lawyers to mingle with people in the cafeteria and in other parts 
of the Agency.  In popular culture, the closest parallel to the CIA’s OIG 
may be the internal affairs divisions of local police departments. 
B.  Appointment and Removal 
Under the IG statute, the CIA’s IG is nominated by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate.61  To provide a competent IG, both the nomination 
and confirmation decisions are to be based on the appointee’s “integrity, 
 
 57. Before the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) 
was enacted, the Director of the CIA (DCIA) coordinated all American intelligence services 
and held the title Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).  See Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004).  As a result of the 
IRTPA, the DCIA is subordinated to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), who now 
leads all American intelligence agencies.  This article uses the abbreviation “DCI” to refer to 
the CIA Director before IRTPA’s passage, and the “DCIA” to refer to the Director after 
IRTPA’s passage.  Further, the abbreviation DCIA will be used in general discussions of the 
statute. 
 58. David L. Boren, The Winds of Change at the CIA, 101 YALE L.J. 853, 856 (1992).  
Senator David Boren (D-OK), was a driving force for better oversight of the CIA after Iran-
Contra, and one of the leading proponents of a statutory IG.  See infra Part III. 
 59. See supra Part II. 
 60. 50 U.S.C. §403q(a) (2006). 
 61. §403q(b)(1). 
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compliance with the security standards of the Agency, and prior experience 
in the field of foreign intelligence.”62  Moreover, the President and Senate 
may consider the appointee’s “demonstrated ability in accounting, financial 
analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or auditing.”63  
Congress’s emphasis on OIG’s independence from the Agency and the 
DCIA makes these attributes critical. 
A statutory IG, however, did not completely divest the DCIA from the 
oversight process.  While only the President has the power to appoint and 
remove the IG,64 the IG still reports directly to the DCIA and serves under 
the DCIA’s supervision.65  The DCIA may also block IG activities or 
investigations when necessary to “protect vital national security interests of 
the United States.”66  And perhaps most important for the DCIA, he may 
add his own input to the IG’s required reports to Congress.67 
C.  Duties and Responsibilities 
1.  Section 403q 
The IG’s duties and responsibilities under Section 403q provide the 
potential for the IG to be both an ally and adversary of the DCIA.  Before 
enactment of Section 403q, the IG only reported “up” to the DCIA, not 
“out” to other persons or entities.68  The non-statutory IG served on the 
DCIA’s management team and was used for updating the DCIA on 
problems, conducting regular audits of programs, and inspecting offices for 
operational efficiency.69  Investigating allegations of wrongdoing also fell 
within OIG’s purview, but the office seldom challenged management’s 
view of those allegations.70 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.  The qualifications for the CIA IG closely mirror those for IGs in other federal 
agencies.  See, e.g., Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (1978). 
 64. §§403q(b)(1),(6).  If the IG is removed, the President must immediately inform the 
intelligence committees in writing of the reasons for removal.  §403q(b)(6). 
 65. §403q(b)(2). 
 66. §403q(b)(3).  When the DCIA blocks IG actions for national security purposes, the 
DCIA must submit a report within seven days to the intelligence committees and to the IG 
that explains why.  §403q(b)(4).  In these cases, the IG may submit comments on the 
DCIA’s report.  Id. 
 67. See infra Part III.C. 
 68. Interview with Frederick P. Hitz, Former CIA IG (1990-1998), in Stillwater, Minn. 
(May 15, 2006). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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While Section 403q retained many of the IG’s former duties,71 it also 
added many new duties.  The IG now issues regular reports to Congress,72 
has the independent power to investigate senior CIA officials (including the 
DCIA),73 and must report certain types of wrongdoing to the Department of 
Justice.74  As a result, an effective IG may often find himself at odds with 
the CIA’s senior management. 
2.  The DCIA’s Ally 
Although some aspects of the IG’s job have changed, the statutory IG 
still retains responsibility for helping the DCIA run a more efficient 
Agency.  Working with the Executive Director and other parts of the 
DCIA’s management team, the IG works to ensure that CIA programs and 
operations are conducted “efficiently and in accordance with applicable law 
and regulations.”75  Beyond providing advice on the broad contours of CIA 
policy, the IG is also responsible to “plan, conduct, supervise, and 
coordinate independently” the audits, inspections, and investigations 
necessary to carry out that policy.76  To be specific, the IG is supposed to 
ensure that the DCIA is kept “fully and currently informed” regarding 
violations of law or protocol – and any other problems within the Agency – 
that OIG uncovers.77  When the IG reports to the DCIA on these issues, he 
must also notify the DCIA of OIG’s corrective measures.78  In all these 
cases, the IG’s statutory duties enhance the DCIA’s ability to manage the 
Agency. 
Congress, to ensure its own access to information about CIA activities, 
provided for many areas of collaboration between the IG and DCIA. A  
touchstone of Section 403q is that it requires the IG to prepare a semiannual 
classified report on OIG’s activities during the preceding six-month 
period.79  This report must include: (1) a description of significant problems, 
abuses, and deficiencies related to CIA programs and operations that OIG 
identified; (2) a description of the corrective action that OIG recommended; 
(3) a statement of whether corrective action has been completed pursuant to 
 
 71. See 50 U.S.C. §403q(c) (2006). 
 72. §403q(d)(1). 
 73. §403q(d)(3). 
 74. §403q(b)(5). 
 75. §403q(c)(1). 
 76. Id. Regarding both the investigative and reporting duties of the office, the IG is to 
comply with “generally accepted government auditing standards.”  §403q(c)(4). 
 77. §403q(c)(2). The scope of subsection (c)(2) is very broad, and encompasses 
“violations of law and regulations, fraud and other serious problems, abuses and deficiencies 
that may occur in [CIA] programs and operations.”  §403q(c)(1). 
 78. §403q(c)(2). 
 79. §403q(d)(1).  The reports are to cover the six-month periods ending June 30 and 
December 30, and must be submitted to the DCIA no later than July 31 and the following 
January 31, respectively; see also id. §403q(c)(4). 
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previous reports; (4) a certification that the IG has had full and direct access 
to all necessary information; (5) a description of how the IG has exercised 
his statutory subpoena power during the period; and (6) any OIG 
recommendations regarding legislation to promote efficiency and eliminate 
fraud and abuse within the Agency.80  Before the semiannual report is 
submitted to the congressional intelligence committees,81 the IG must 
provide it to the DCIA, who may add comments before submission.82  
Similarly, when the IG prepares a report at the request of the chairman or 
ranking minority member of either intelligence committee, the DCIA must 
transmit the report to the intelligence committees.83 
Beyond collaboration on semiannual reports, the IG and DCIA handle 
major problems when the IG becomes aware of “particularly serious or 
flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the administration of 
[CIA] programs and operations.”84  In these cases, the IG must immediately 
report OIG’s findings to the DCIA.85  Upon receiving the IG’s report, the 
DCIA must transmit the report – again, with any comments added – to the 
intelligence committees within seven days.86  If the problems rise to 
potential violations of federal criminal law, the IG is also bound to report to 
the Attorney General.87  The DCIA is entitled to receive a copy of these 
reports to the Attorney General, but is not entitled to add any comments.88 
Finally, the DCIA and IG handle whistleblowers.  They are supposed to 
cooperate when employees or contractors89 intend to report to Congress “a 
complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern.”90  CIA 
personnel, rather than take such complaints or information directly to 
Congress, may submit their concerns to the IG, who must evaluate their 
 
 80. §403q(d)(1). 
 81. §403q(d)(5)(G)(ii). Under Section 403q, the term “intelligence committees” 
indicates the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives 
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.  Hereinafter, “intelligence 
committees” should be understood to refer to both committees. 
 82. §403q(d)(1). 
 83. §403q(d)(4).  In cases of committee-requested IG reports, Section 403q does not, 
however, provide the DCIA with a right to add comments to the IG report, though the DCIA 
does receive the report before the intelligence committees.  Id. 
 84. §403q(d)(2). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. §403q(b)(5).  Under Title 28 of the U.S. Code, the IG must report to the Attorney 
General “any information, allegation, or complaint” that OIG receives, and which constitutes 
a violation of federal criminal law involving CIA programs and operations.  Id.  See also 28 
U.S.C. §535(b) (2006) (outlining a requirement for all executive branches to report 
violations of federal law to the Attorney General). 
 88. §403q(b)(5). 
 89. Hereinafter, use of the terms “employees” and “personnel” should be taken to also 
include CIA contractors and their employees. 
 90. §403q(d)(5)(A). 
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credibility within fourteen days.91  Next, the IG submits an evaluation to the 
DCIA, who reports to the intelligence committee within seven days.92  Even 
when the employee chooses to contact Congress directly,93 the employee 
still must furnish both the IG and the DCIA with a statement of the 
complaint and notice of his or her intent to contact the intelligence 
committees.94  This helps ensure that Congress will be brought into the 
matter by secure means. 
3.  The DCIA’s Adversary 
In some situations, the IG and DCIA work in harmony for the Agency.  
Yet a major goal of Section 403q was to create an independent check on the 
CIA.95  For this purpose, Section 403q provides the IG, in several situations, 
with the power to “notify or submit a report” directly to congressional 
intelligence committees; these independent reports can put the IG at odds 
with the DCIA and other senior officials at the CIA.96 
The IG may directly contact the intelligence committees if he or she is 
not being permitted to operate freely within the Agency.  For instance, 
when the IG and the DCIA cannot resolve differences about the IG’s duties 
or responsibilities, the IG may reach out to the intelligence committees.97  
The IG may also inform the committees directly when, “after exhausting all 
possible alternatives, [the IG] is unable to obtain significant documentary 
information” during the course of an audit, inspection, or investigation.98  
Although Section 403q does not give Congress any specific powers to settle 
these conflicts, the IG’s direct access advances two congressional goals: (1) 
keep the committees informed99 and (2) ensure the independence and 
effectiveness of OIG.100 
In other cases, the IG may bypass the DCIA when a current or former 
high-ranking CIA official is subject to an IG investigation, inspection, or 
audit.101  Further, the IG may report directly to the committees when the IG 
 
 91. Id.; see also §403q(d)(5)(E) (stating that the IG must notify the reporting 
employee within three days of all actions taken with respect to the issues reported to the IG). 
 92. §403q(d)(5)(A)-(C). 
 93. §403q(d)(5)(D).  An employee may only contact Congress upon a finding by the 
IG that the report was not credible, or if the IG does not accurately transmit the employee’s 
concerns to the DCIA. 
 94. §403q(d)(5)(D)(ii)(I).  Before contacting the intelligence committees, the employee 
also must obtain direction from the IG regarding the proper means by which to contact the 
committees “in accordance with appropriate security practices.”  §403q(d)(5)(D)(ii)(II). 
 95. §403q(a)(1). 
 96. §403q(d)(3). 
 97. §403q(d)(3)(A). 
 98. §403q(d)(3)(E). 
 99. §403q(a)(4). 
 100. §403q(a)(1). 
 101. §403q(d)(3). See also §403q(d)(3)(B) (stating that CIA officials who fall under 
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has contacted the Justice Department about possible criminal conduct by a 
current or former high-ranking CIA official,102 or when the IG receives 
notice from the Justice Department approving or declining prosecution.103 
With the statutory provisions of Section 403q, Congress granted the IG 
much more power than was previously available.  The section reflects 
Congress’s desire that OIG function “independently” and be “appropriately 
accountable to Congress”104 and its assumption that in some cases the 
DCIA’s close connection to senior officers will create conflicts with the IG 
or the appearance of conflicts. 
D.  The Toolbox 
Section 403q provides the IG with many tools to monitor CIA 
operations.  One of the strongest tools is the capacity to “receive and 
investigate complaints or information from any person” regarding any 
activities that constitute wrongdoing or gross inefficiency within the 
Agency.105  To support the IG’s use of this tool, the statute established 
whistleblower protection for employees who report in good faith.106  OIG’s 
capacity to receive this information – and to protect persons providing it – 
is especially important as an internal check because it provides a means of 
learning about problems in the most secret of operations, typically the most 
difficult to monitor.107 
 
Section 403q(d)(3) include any person who holds or has held the position of: Executive 
Director; Deputy Director for Operations; Deputy Director for Intelligence; Deputy Director 
for Administration; Deputy Director for Science and Technology; as well as any official who 
holds or has held a position in the CIA that is subject to presidential appointment (with 
Senate confirmation)). 
 102. §403q(d)(3)(C). 
 103. §403q(d)(3)(D). 
 104. §403q(a)(1).  Even with the significant emphasis in Section 403q on disclosure 
and the provision of information, the statute’s authors realized that IG investigations could 
implicate operations vital to national security.  The statute provides that, in all cases, the IG 
must protect intelligence sources and methods, and must take appropriate measures to 
minimize the disclosure of sources and methods in the reports.  §403q(c)(3). 
 105. §403q(e)(3) (emphasis added).  Included are any “activity constituting a violation 
of laws, rules, or regulations, mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a 
substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety.”  Id.  OIG must protect the 
whistleblower’s identity unless disclosure is unavoidable. §403q(e)(3)(A).  A limited 
exception also exists by which OIG may disclose the whistleblower’s identity to a Justice 
Department official who determines whether prosecution is necessary.  Id. 
 106. §403q(e)(3)(B).  But Subsection (e)(3)(B) also provides that employees who 
complain or disclose information “with the knowledge that it was false or with willful 
disregard for its truth or falsity” receive no protection from reprisals.  Id. 
 107. Frederick Hitz, the first person to occupy the statutory IG position (1990-98), 
alluded to the importance of this power: “If an operation is watertight, it’s very tough to find 
out about it.  But the corrosive effect [of wrongdoing in] those operations will eventually get 
its way into the public. . . .  If the press can find sources, the [OIG] will have sources.”  
Interview with Frederick P. Hitz, supra note 68. 
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To succeed, the IG must have access to all CIA employees and all CIA 
contractors whose testimony the IG deems necessary.108  Along with 
unfettered access to CIA personnel, the IG must also have access to all 
records109 that relate to the programs and operations for which the IG is 
responsible.110 
To facilitate OIG in these matters, Section 403q allows the DCIA to 
discipline CIA personnel who do not cooperate with OIG.  Indeed, a CIA 
employee who fails to cooperate is subject to administrative reprimand, 
including potential discharge or termination of contract.111  But, in a break 
from the statute’s overall theme of a self-sufficient OIG, the power to issue 
reprimands, as well as the discretion to determine their severity, rest solely 
with the DCIA.112  The DCIA, usually a political appointee, might be more 
reluctant than the IG to cross the rank and file in the clandestine service.  
Conflict, after all, is more a part of the IG’s job description than the 
DCIA’s. 
The IG’s direct access to Congress is complemented by direct access to 
the DCIA.  Although the IG depends on the DCIA to discipline Agency 
personnel, Section 403q does require the IG to be afforded “direct and 
prompt access” to the DCIA.113  Thus, the IG can seek out the DCIA as soon 
as problems arise, and can demand a personal hearing when other 
disciplinary measures seem inadequate.  Combined with the IG’s right to 
notify the intelligence committees about disputes with the DCIA,114 the IG’s 
access to the DCIA’s suite allows the IG to express his opinion about how 
insubordinate personnel should be handled.  In this indirect way, the IG’s 
ties to Congress and the DCIA help persuade CIA personnel to cooperate 
with investigations. 
 
 108. §403q(e)(2).  In executing OIG’s investigatory duties, the IG may administer and 
take oaths and affidavits with the same effect as those taken before “an officer with a seal.”  
§403q(e)(4). 
 109. Included under Section 403q are “all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, 
papers, recommendations, or other material” necessary to the IG’s duties.  §403q(e)(2). 
 110. Id.  The IG, through a federal subpoena, may also compel employees to produce 
documents necessary to an investigation. §403q(e)(5)(A), (D).  The IG may not, however, 
issue a subpoena on behalf of any CIA component but OIG.  §403q(e)(5)(C).  In cases 
involving other federal agencies, the IG may not use the subpoena power to compel records, 
documents, or other evidence.  §403q(e)(5)(B). 
 111. §403q(e)(2). 
 112. Id.  Subsection §403q(e)(7), which provides for the selection of the IG’s staff, also 
gives the DCIA control over OIG.  Two restrictions are placed on the IG here: (1) the staff 
members must have “the requisite training and experience to enable [them] to carry out 
[their] duties effectively”; and (2) selections are “[s]ubject to applicable law and the policies 
of the Director.”  §403q(e)(7) (emphasis added).  Since Section 403q does not clarify the 
phrase “policies of the Director,” it is conceivable that the DCIA has veto power over the 
IG’s selection of staff. 
 113. §403q(e)(1). 
 114. §403q(d)(3)(A). 
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Whether or not the IG is backed up by statute, internal checks depend 
very much on the personal qualities of the IG and the staff.  People, in our 
account, bring the regulations and other papers to life. 
IV.  BIOGRAPHIES OF INSPECTORS GENERAL 
A.  Lyman Kirkpatrick 
Long before Iran-Contra, Lyman Kirkpatrick stands out from the CIA’s 
early days.  Part of the American elite, Kirkpatrick graduated from 
Princeton University and gained some experience as a journalist.  During 
World War II, he was recruited into the Office of Strategic Services, the 
CIA’s predecessor, and was an intelligence briefing officer to General 
Omar Bradley.  Having worked at the Office of Strategic Services, 
Kirkpatrick became a founding father of the CIA at its creation in 1947.  He 
served as a case officer and as executive assistant to the DCI.  In the early 
1950s, Kirkpatrick was instrumental in the fusion of the CIA’s foreign 
intelligence group and the covert actions arm into the Directorate of Plans. 
It may have been on a trip to Thailand that Kirkpatrick contracted polio.  
Hospitalized in 1952, Kirkpatrick was then confined to a wheelchair, unable 
to continue his fieldwork with the vigor of his younger days.  When he 
returned to CIA headquarters, Richard Helms, another career officer, had 
taken over the position as the head of operations. For Kirkpatrick, someone 
who aspired to the top position himself, paralysis was more than a physical 
disability.  Treated as a different person at CIA, he lost confidence in 
himself – no longer one of the golden boys. 
Removed from the field, Kirkpatrick was assigned to a position that 
kept him safe at headquarters.  He became the CIA’s IG in 1953.  The IG 
position, which was not something he sought, was forced on him by 
unfortunate circumstances.  As DCI Richard Helms described, “As IG, Kirk 
felt that he had been removed from the command line.”115  Yet even 
confined to a wheelchair, Kirkpatrick was able to make some trips to 
inspect overseas offices.116 
Kirkpatrick, IG at the CIA for eight years, was not the first person to 
hold the position.  As Kirkpatrick notes in his memoirs, DCI General 
Walter Bedell Smith created the position, appointing Stuart Hedden, a 
“lawyer-businessman.”117 
 
 115. RICHARD HELMS, A LOOK OVER MY SHOULDER: A LIFE IN THE CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 194 (2003). 
 116. LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK, JR., THE REAL CIA: AN INSIDER’S VIEW OF THE 
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF OUR GOVERNMENT’S MOST IMPORTANT AGENCY 154 
(1968). 
 117. Id. at 129. 
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Not all of the CIA was receptive to having an IG, no matter the person 
in the position.  According to Kirkpatrick, the operations division had 
established “its own inspection and review staff in an obvious attempt to 
forestall any centralized or outside inspections.”118  Case officers, in the 
perennial ploy of self-regulation, said they could police themselves.  
Kirkpatrick, however, was able to overcome some of their resistance.  Even 
so, his view of the IG’s role was more limited than the views of statutory 
IGs.  He believed the IG should “make suggestions for improvement that 
the management would either accept or reject.”119  “If management did not 
accept the recommendation,” he continued, “then it was management’s 
responsibility from that point on.”120  Thus, the IG was a warning device, 
not an outside source of discipline. 
Perhaps Kirkpatrick’s way of evening the score with colleagues who 
could still serve as case officers was to be overly critical of their 
performance.  As Kirkpatrick stated, “If the inspector general is to be 
effective, he must be tough and completely objective, even if it means 
losing friends.”121  During his tenure, he probably did lose some friends.  
The verdict on his performance as IG was mixed. 
Kirkpatrick’s delivery of the Bay of Pigs report, not to mention its 
content,122 showed Kirkpatrick at his meanest.  Rather than deliver the 
report to Allen Dulles, a lame duck DCI at the time, Kirkpatrick delivered it 
to the DCI-designate, John McCone, who was about to travel to California 
to put personal matters in order before he assumed duties at the Agency.  
Displeased, McCone recalled all copies of the report. 
Kirkpatrick also lambasted the clandestine service for general 
incompetence and for using unknowing subjects for experiments on the 
effects of LSD.  As Tim Weiner wrote, Kirkpatrick “became a constant 
bearer of bad tidings about the caliber of the CIA’s personnel, training, and 
performance.”123  All in all, the CIA’s management did not take much action 
in response to these reports; they swatted Kirkpatrick away like a mosquito 
at a summer picnic.  As for LSD, it was not until the Church Committee’s 
hearings that the wrongdoing of the MKULTRA program124 was revealed. 
 
 118. Id. at 130. 
 119. Id. at 131. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 154. 
 122. See infra Part V.B.1. 
 123. TIM WEINER, LEGACY OF ASHES: THE HISTORY OF THE CIA 88 (2008). 
 124. MKULTRA was a secret CIA research project into the use of LSD and other 
mind-altering drugs.  NORMAN POLMAR & THOMAS B. ALLEN, SPY BOOK: THE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ESPIONAGE 426-427 (2d ed. 2004).  Authorized by DCI Helms and led by 
Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, director of the CIA chemical division, MKULTRA was characterized as 
“unethical and illicit activities.”  Id. at 426.  In one experiment, Dr. Gottlieb spiked a fellow 
scientist’s drinks with LSD, resulting in the severe deterioration of the other scientist’s 
psyche so that he hurled himself out of a tenth-floor window.  Id.  MKULTRA also involved 
testing drugs on prostitutes lured into safe houses by CIA officers.  Id.  When details of the 
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His ambition neutralized, Kirkpatrick did not rise much higher than IG.  
In 1962, he was named the CIA’s executive director, a newly created 
position.125  Later, he served on the Covert Operations Study Group, a 
committee of “wise men” DCI Richard Helms assembled to advise 
incoming President Nixon on the clandestine service.126  For examples of 
more assertive IGs, one needs to look to the future. 
B.  Frederick P. Hitz 
Frederick Hitz was an IG for a new era.  A graduate of Princeton 
University and of Harvard Law School, Hitz had extensive experience both 
inside and outside the CIA before he became its first statutory IG.  On 
many occasions, this experience allowed Hitz to participate in executive-
legislative interactions and to become a Washington hand.  With a classic 
pedigree for intelligence work, Hitz first joined CIA in 1967.  As an 
operations officer, Hitz served overseas, and many of his assignments are 
still classified.  After his first stint at CIA, Hitz took posts at the 
Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, including turns as Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs and Director of 
Congressional Affairs for the Department of Energy.  Hitz returned to the 
CIA in 1978, and served as Legislative Counsel to the DCI, and then 
Deputy Director for Europe in the Directorate of Operations until 1981, 
when he left the government for private practice.  He returned to the CIA 
again as IG in 1990. 
During his tenure as IG from 1990 to 1998, Hitz presided over many 
high-profile investigations.  Between 1994 and 1996, OIG investigated the 
case of CIA mole Aldrich Ames and the alleged CIA connections to 
murders in Guatemala and to cocaine trafficking from Nicaragua.127  Hitz, 
although he might have clashed with particular officers during the course of 
an investigation, is still respected within the ranks of the clandestine 
service.  He was one of them, after all, and had not developed Kirkpatrick’s 
animus toward his former peers.  Today, at the IG’s office, there are still 
staff members who remember their time with Hitz fondly.  Hitz, an able 
manager who cultivated loyalty, deserves credit for building the status of 
the IG’s office within the Agency. 
 
project were revealed, the Church Committee said they “demonstrate[d] a failure of the 
CIA’s leadership to pay adequate attention to the rights of individuals and to provide 
effective guidance to CIA employees.”  Id. at 427. 
 125. JOHN RANELAGH, THE AGENCY: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE CIA 412-413 
(1986). 
 126. WEINER, supra note 123, at 293. 
 127. See infra Part V.C.1-3. 
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Hitz, a frequent commentator in the media, continues to be active in 
academia, writing books about spy literature and the purpose of spying.128  
His willingness to write and to speak about covert operations, however, 
puts him at odds with the hard-core CIA members of his generation.  The 
code for these former officers is still silence. 
C.  Britt Snider 
Hitz’s successor, Britt Snider, graduated from Davidson College, 
Virginia Law School, and, later, an executive program in national and 
international security at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of 
Government.  Immediately after law school, he served as a captain in the 
Army Signal Corps from 1969 to 1971. 
Although Snider was not an intelligence operator by trade, his career 
before OIG touched on many aspects of the intelligence community.  
Before he was appointed the CIA’s IG, Snider held several positions related 
to audits and investigations.  From 1975 to 1976, he investigated Defense 
Department intelligence activities as counsel to the Church Committee.  
The Church Committee, of course, conducted the most significant external 
inquiry into American intelligence activities.  Soon thereafter, Snider 
served a ten-year term as Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, 
where his staff monitored compliance with DoD policy regarding 
counterintelligence and classification.  Next, he served as minority counsel 
to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence from 1987 to 1989, and 
chief counsel from 1989 to 1995.  For the Senate, Snider was deeply 
involved in monitoring the CIA’s activities from positions of external 
oversight.  And during his tenure on Capitol Hill, Snider actually drafted 
the bill that became the law for a statutory IG at CIA.129  After his time on 
Capitol Hill, Snider served first as staff director of the Presidential 
Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community, then as Special Counsel to DCI George Tenet, someone Snider 
had gotten to know during their work together as staffers on Capitol Hill. 
When Snider was appointed the CIA’s IG, he was a newcomer to the 
CIA’s headquarters, but not to the field of audits and inspections.  Based on 
years of experience on Capitol Hill, Snider quickly transformed himself 
from an external guard into an internal guard.  The evidence is thin, 
however, that his prior experience made him an exceptional IG.  Perhaps 
what it takes for effective oversight from Congress is quite different from 
 
 128. See, e.g., FREDERICK P. HITZ, THE GREAT GAME: THE MYTHS AND REALITIES OF 
ESPIONAGE (2004); FREDERICK P. HITZ, WHY SPY?: ESPIONAGE IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 
(2008). 
 129. See L. Britt Snider, A Unique Vantage Point: Creating a Statutory Inspector 
General at the CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-
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what it takes for oversight from within the Agency.  Overall, Snider was a 
good IG, no better (and no worse) than the insider Fred Hitz. 
Snider’s tenure as IG was not as eventful as the terms that preceded and 
succeeded him.  This may say as much about the CIA during this period as 
it does about Snider.  Internal CIA investigations garnered far fewer 
headlines from 1998 to January 2001 than they did during the preceding 
eight years.  Notable cases under Snider involved former DCI John 
Deutch’s misuse of classified information on his home computer – a case 
CIA management declined to refer for criminal prosecution – and the 
mistaken bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the U.S. 
offensive against Slobodan Milosevic – a case that embarrassed both 
President Clinton and the CIA.130 Compared to Hitz, Snider was a quiet 
manager.  Snider, more introverted than Hitz, did not work his staff the way 
an operations officer spots, develops, pitches, and handles a human source.  
Snider, a Virginian squire, was more genteel than that. 
Since his retirement from the federal government in 2001, Snider has 
remained active in the world of intelligence.  He published a retrospective 
of the CIA’s relationship with Congress,131 lectured on intelligence policy 
and oversight, and chaired President Bush’s Public Interest Declassification 
Board from 2004 to 2008.  Even so, Snider did experience one setback.  He 
was forced to resign as staff director for the joint congressional inquiry into 
9/11 (which preceded the more-famous 9/11 Commission), reportedly 
because of the way he handled a personnel matter.  Politics may have also 
played a role since Senator Richard Shelby, a harsh critic of George Tenet, 
may have used this personnel matter against someone he viewed as Tenet’s 
ally.  More recently, on behalf of the new Obama Administration, Snider 
prepared nominees for Senate confirmation to senior intelligence positions, 
including Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair and Director of the 
CIA Leon Panetta. 
D.  John Helgerson 
The Inspector General when President Obama took office was not a 
field man like Lyman Kirkpatrick and Fred Hitz.  John Helgerson, the 
CIA’s IG from 2002 to 2009, rose through the CIA’s ranks as an analyst 
within the Directorate of Intelligence (DI).  His academic specialty was 
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African politics.  Compared to Snider, though, Helgerson was more of an 
insider from the start. 
After Helgerson obtained a degree from Saint Olaf College in 
Minnesota, he completed master’s and doctorate degrees in political science 
at Duke University.  Before he joined the CIA, his academic postings were 
at the University of Zambia and the University of Cincinnati. 
Within the DI, Helgerson rose to the top, serving as Deputy Director for 
Intelligence from 1989 to 1993.  Helgerson noted at his confirmation 
hearing to become IG that both as an analyst and as a supervisor of 
analysts, he insisted on “integrity” and “independence.”  In the best 
tradition of CIA analysts, Helgerson viewed his job as speaking truth to 
power. 
In addition, Helgerson had also served as Director of the Office of 
Congressional Affairs, a position that put him in regular contact with the 
congressional oversight committees where he became savvy about 
Washington politics.  The oversight committees, of course, would be one of 
his two reporting lines when he became IG.  From 1998 until 2000, 
Helgerson worked in the IG’s Office as deputy to Britt Snider.  In 2001, 
before President Bush nominated him as IG, he was named Chairman of the 
National Intelligence Council, a position that returned him to his roots in 
analysis. 
As the third Senate-confirmed IG, Helgerson was not immune to 
political pressures from outside and inside the CIA.  Jane Mayer, a 
journalist for The New Yorker, reports that Vice President Cheney reacted 
to Helgerson’s 2004 report about the CIA’s detention and interrogation 
program by issuing a summons of sorts for the IG to come to the White 
House.132  Cheney, a strong CIA supporter, made clear that he did not want 
the IG looking too deeply into the CIA’s closet.  Cheney, as a stand-in for 
George W. Bush, represented Helgerson’s other reporting line from the 
DCIA to the President.  Meetings like this between top policy makers and 
the IG are not common.  Helgerson, perhaps, had spoken too much truth to 
power. 
Later, in response to complaints from the operations division that the 
IG was out to get them, DCIA Hayden appointed a top aide, Robert Dietz, 
to investigate.  Dietz’s investigation, over cries of foul from Capitol Hill, 
led to Helgerson agreeing to the appointment of an ombudsman within the 
IG’s office and to the adoption of internal guidelines to make the IG’s 
investigations fairer and more transparent.  The operations people, buffeted 
between accusations that they were not aggressive enough before 9/11 and 
recriminations that they were too aggressive after 9/11, struck back at the 
IG in the hopes of attaining a balance.  But those who see the IG’s office as 
the most effective check on CIA abuses viewed the Hayden/Dietz gambit as 
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an improper attempt to limit the IG’s role.  Fred Hitz, for that matter, was 
one of the Administration’s loudest critics.133 
V.  MAJOR IG INVESTIGATIONS 
Now that our IG story has been told through its main characters – 
Kirkpatrick, Hitz, Snider, and Helgerson – the frame shifts to individual 
investigations to provide another look into the IG’s office. Personal threads, 
separating then combining, form an intricate institutional fabric.  Most of 
what the IG does remains classified, off limits to any public assessment. 
That includes regular inspections and audits. 
Another fertile area of scholarship screened off by secrecy is the extent 
of coordination between the CIA’s IG and the other IGs in the intelligence 
community.  If the various agencies in the intelligence community are 
expected to do more to coordinate in the post-9/11 era, it seems logical that 
the CIA’s IG should share experiences with IGs from the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, the National Security Agency, the FBI, 
and others.  Coordination is a new buzzword.  The public record does, in 
fact, indicate periodic meetings of IGs; but, for now, a classifier’s stamp 
prevents us and other scholars from knowing what actually occurs at those 
meetings. 
For these reasons, our focus on major investigations is not necessarily a 
comprehensive sample of the IG’s activities.  Nonetheless, we believe that 
it is better to draw conclusions from what we see on the surface than to 
ignore the fabric altogether. 
A.  Overview 
Since Fred Hitz was named the CIA’s first statutory IG in 1990, OIG 
has assumed a visible role in investigations of the CIA.  These 
investigations offer clues as to whether the purported benefits of a statutory 
IG actually materialize in practice.  On cases ranging from the isolated 
malfeasance of CIA officers in Central America to massive, Agency-wide 
breakdowns, OIG has shown that the more serious the incident, the less 
OIG has functioned as the check Congress intended.134  Our sense is that 
statutory powers have not resulted in a commensurate increase in the depth 
and breadth of IG investigations.  Before or after the statutory position was 
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created, oversight seems to have been ad hoc, as dependent on quirks, 
personalities, and circumstances as on formal powers that come from 
Congress.  Over the years, despite all the legislative action, there has been 
continuity in the IG’s performance – a continuous record of mixed results. 
B.  Investigations Prior to Iran-Contra 
1.  Bay of Pigs Invasion 
Few IG reports have been harsher than Lyman Kirkpatrick’s assessment 
of the Bay of Pigs invasion.  To overthrow Fidel Castro’s dictatorship in 
Cuba, the CIA trained and equipped a small group of Cuban exiles for an 
amphibious invasion of the country.135  The invasion, which began on April 
17, 1961, was defeated in less than seventy-two hours.136  Due to a 
combination of poor planning and poor execution, as well as the possibility 
that Castro’s intelligence services had penetrated the operation, 
approximately 1,200 of the 1,300 invasion troops were captured by Cuban 
forces, and another 100 were killed in action.137  The invasion also prompted 
Castro to round up about 100,000 suspected dissidents within Cuba, 
crushing any prospects for internal revolt.138 
To conclude America’s sad saga in Cuba, Castro released most of the 
1,200 prisoners in exchange for $53 million worth of food and medicine 
that Attorney General Robert Kennedy raised from private sources.139  The 
events played themselves out in the news, and the fiasco was described as 
“the first time that a CIA operation was exposed to the klieg lights of a 
national scandal.”140  The fallout included resignations of CIA Director 
Allen Dulles and Director of Plans Richard Bissell.141 
Lyman Kirkpatrick, perhaps with encouragement from the White 
House, completed his report within six months of the invasion.  The internal 
guard took the lead.  Kirkpatrick, the former operations officer, identified 
many mistakes that doomed the operation from the start.  Operational 
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command was fragmented such that “the project lacked a single, high-level 
full time commander” to carry out the vast mission.142  Kirkpatrick noted 
that, rather than staff the mission with the Agency’s best and brightest, the 
CIA relied on people in the bottom third of their respective government 
grades.143 The Bay of Pigs planners had not recruited top officers, and the 
CIA section chiefs had not given up their key performers.  Richard Helms, 
for one, a believer in foreign-intelligence gathering rather than covert 
action, kept a safe distance from what he considered a foolish operation.  
Lesser officers, in turn, supervised between seventy-five and one hundred 
people, rather than five, as originally intended.144 
Kirkpatrick’s report, relentless in its criticism, also found “extremely 
serious mistakes in planning.”145  First, the planners did not obtain objective 
appraisal of the operation from those experienced in covert action.  Second, 
despite setbacks on the beach in Cuba, they did not advise President 
Kennedy to cancel the operation when success had “become dubious.”146  
Third, the planners failed to recognize that the project had become too large 
and overt for the Agency to handle alone.  Fourth, in their impatience, they 
had neither put the plans in writing nor requested specific approval from the 
White House.147  Kirkpatrick, all in all, saw the lack of independent scrutiny 
as the explanation why the planners blithely sent a small group of men 
against far greater numbers and far better arms.  Anyone who closely 
followed Cuba, he believed, would have realized that the expectation of 
local support was a fantasy.148  Going further, his report criticized a lack of 
adequate intelligence support,149 a corps of intelligence officers that spoke 
little Spanish and often treated the Cubans “like dirt,”150 and deficiencies in 
the CIA’s paramilitary forces on air and sea.151 
The report’s recommendations flowed from its criticisms.  First, a 
dedicated and unified command should handle major covert operations.  
Second, these operations should be transferred to the Department of 
Defense when they became overt.  Third, these operations should receive an 
independent appraisal before implementation.  Fourth, the CIA needed to 
improve the foreign language proficiency of its officers, as well as their 
clandestine air and sea capabilities.  In effect, Kirkpatrick challenged the 
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cult of intelligence that had grown around the CIA’s purported successes on 
prior covert actions in Iran and Guatemala. 
Kirkpatrick’s report, no surprise, faced immediate resistance at CIA.  
Within the small group who actually saw the report, many rejected it as a 
“‘malicious’ attack on individual officers and a threat to the very future of 
the agency.”152  To protect the Agency, DCI John McCone – successor to 
DCI Dulles – had most copies of the report collected and destroyed.153  
(There is no evidence that the report was distributed outside the executive 
branch.)  The few copies that survived were locked in the DCI’s personal 
safe, not to be disclosed to the public until 1998, when the National 
Security Archive succeeded with a Freedom of Information Act request.154 
2.  Nicaraguan Guerilla Manual 
In late 1984, press reports revealed that the CIA had provided 
Nicaraguan Contras with an instruction manual for use in their fight against 
the Sandinista government.155  The tactics included hiring criminals to kill 
other contras; blackmailing Nicaraguan citizens to join the rebel cause; and 
the “selective use of violence” to “neutralize” judges, police, and 
government officials.156  The manual, assembled by an unnamed CIA 
contractor,157 was based almost word for word on a 1968 manual that U.S. 
Special Forces had used for fighting in Southeast Asia; the prior manual 
included instructions for the “removal” of civilian leaders, based on tactics 
the Communists had used during the 1940s in taking over China.158 
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The CIA manual for Nicaragua caused loud protests from Congress.159 
The manual also became a topic in the 1984 presidential debates between 
Ronald Reagan and Walter Mondale.160  In response to the outcry, external 
and internal checks on the CIA were triggered.  Congress investigated the 
manual through the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
(HPSCI), and the executive branch investigated through the CIA’s IG and 
the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board.161 
The IG investigation was the first of the three to be completed, 
presenting a report to Congress on November 9, 1984.162  Although the 
report was not made public, the press reported its conclusions that “no one 
had intended to bypass the executive order prohibiting United States 
officials from taking part in or encouraging assassination [activities banned 
under Executive Order 12,333],” and that the manual’s contractor-author 
was oblivious of Executive Order 12,333.163  OIG implicitly agreed, 
however, that the manual was poorly conceived and stated.  The OIG report 
– and the Intelligence Oversight Board report that followed – also found 
that “there had been no violation by C.I.A. personnel or contract employees 
of the Constitution or the laws of the United States, executive orders or 
Presidential directives,” and that no senior officials had helped produce the 
manual.164 
The IG report limited its recommendation for disciplinary action to a 
small group within CIA, as well as suggesting corrections to “strengthen 
management and oversight within the C.I.A.”165  As a result, President 
Reagan agreed to discipline six mid-level CIA officials: three received 
letters of reprimand, two were suspended without pay, and the manual’s 
author resigned from his contract with the Agency.166  Therefore, even if the 
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IG could not change the overall structure of the CIA, it could create severe 
consequences for the CIA’s employees.  In that sense, the IG showed itself 
as more thorn than trifle. 
The HPSCI, in its own report for Congress, went so far as to conclude 
that the manual violated the law because it advised overthrow of the 
Sandinista government, contrary to congressional limitations on covert 
actions against Nicaragua.167  Despite this conclusion and the discontent of a 
vocal group of Senators and Representatives,168 the HPSCI, dominated by 
Democrats, did not push for any remedial or disciplinary actions.169  The 
most significant action thus came from OIG, an internal check on the CIA. 
C.  Investigations Conducted by the Statutory IG 
1.  Aldrich Ames Case 
The revelation in February 1994 that a thirty-year CIA officer had been 
selling secrets for a decade rocked the American intelligence community.  
Just as James Angleton, the legendary head of CIA counterintelligence, had 
always feared, at least one mole had been buried deep at the CIA. 
At the end of a two-year FBI investigation, CIA officer Aldrich H. 
Ames and his wife Rosario were arrested for selling American secrets to the 
Soviet and Russian intelligence agencies.170  The CIA’s “damage 
assessment” found more than one hundred blown operations; thousands of 
pages of secret documents transferred to the KGB; and at least ten 
American agents in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe executed.171  In 
effect, Ames destroyed the CIA’s spy network within the Soviet Union and, 
for many years to come, crippled the CIA’s efforts to gather intelligence on 
the Soviet Union.172 
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The Ames case, however it was spun, revealed a gaping hole in the 
CIA’s security and counterintelligence practices.  Someone needed to get to 
the bottom of things.  If the CIA’s clandestine service, whether in 
operations or counterintelligence, could not ferret out spies on its own, then 
another check was needed. 
The IG was one of many entities, inside and outside the Agency, that 
took an interest in the Ames case.  The IG investigation, after the fact, listed 
multiple failures by the CIA to prevent and to reveal Ames’s treachery.  
Some failures bordered on the bizarre.  Even when the CIA suspected that a 
traitor – rather than a technical problem – blew those operations, it kept its 
suspicions from the FBI.  So for no apparent reason, the agency with 
primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute espionage was kept in 
the dark for years. 
The IG’s final report concluded that it was widely known within the 
CIA that Ames had a “bad reputation in terms of integrity, dependability 
and discretion.”173  Nonetheless, much like teachers who pass students on 
rather than flunk them, Ames’s managers continued to promote him until he 
was “perfectly placed to betray almost all of CIA’s most sensitive Soviet 
assets.”174  The CIA had failed to follow up on a 1985 report from FBI 
agents who saw Ames visit the Soviet embassy in Washington, then failed 
to act promptly on reports that Ames, complete with new teeth and new 
clothes, was living well beyond his means.175  Despite the CIA’s failures, 
the IG refrained from recommending any specific measures against CIA 
personnel.  Discipline was left to the discretion of R. James Woolsey, 
President Clinton’s first DCI, who hesitated to take action against “the 
troops.”176 
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The IG report, serving as the chief reference for the intelligence 
committees, provided fuel for congressional critique of the CIA.177  This 
was part of a pattern in which an internal critique was woven into an 
external critique.  The Senate report criticized DCI Woolsey for not 
discharging, demoting, or suspending anyone for the CIA’s failures, and 
scolded the CIA bureaucracy for its tolerance of “serious personal and 
professional misconduct among its employees.”178  In addition, the Senate 
and House reports faulted both the CIA and the FBI for not communicating 
or cooperating.179 
Until FBI special agent Robert Hanssen was outed as a Soviet/Russian 
spy, the FBI lorded it over the CIA for allowing a mole to burrow inside the 
house.  No matter all the prior calls for cooperation between law 
enforcement and the intelligence community, it took September 11 to 
remind the American public of the horrors that result when their security 
services do not work hand in hand.  There seems to be a cycle of abuse, 
reform, and repeated abuse. 
2.  Clandestine Service in Guatemala 
In March 1995, the CIA was again connected to murders.  This time, 
allegations were made about CIA activities in Guatemala.  Representative 
Robert Torricelli, a Democrat from New Jersey, breached an oath of 
secrecy and publicized allegations that a Guatemalan military officer on the 
CIA’s payroll, Col. Julio Roberto Alpirez, had ordered the killings of an 
American innkeeper, Michael DeVine, and of a Guatemalan guerilla, Efrain 
Bamaca Velasquez, who was married to an American attorney.180  
Representative Torricelli said he had received a tip from the National 
Security Agency that both the CIA and the United States Army knew that 
Alpirez was involved in the killings.181 
Once the allegations went public, President Clinton called on the CIA’s 
IG to investigate.182  This investigation revealed that the Agency had 
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removed its Guatemalan station chief in February 1995 after OIG accused 
him of suppressing reports of human rights violations by the Guatemalan 
military.183  Making matters worse, the station chief had failed to disclose 
the CIA’s ties to Alpirez.  This chief was a habitual offender who, nine 
months earlier, had been disciplined for a separate failure to disclose.184  As 
with other incidents, the omissions and misstatements created as many 
problems as the underlying acts in Guatemala. 
In its comprehensive report, the IG was most critical of omissions in the 
reporting line from the field to headquarters.  The internal checks within the 
clandestine service, it turned out, were not up to the task.  Thus, the 
omissions in the Guatemalan reporting caused several CIA careers to 
unravel.  Lying to foreigners was one thing, something necessary to 
espionage.  Lying to colleagues with security clearances and a need to 
know threatened the integrity and the effectiveness of an intelligence 
service. 
The discipline that resulted from the IG investigation into Alpirez was 
described as forceful.185  The IG’s final report harshly criticized CIA 
officers in Guatemala for hiding their activities from two American 
ambassadors, Congress, and the CIA.186  While OIG did not uncover any 
violations of law, its report led an internal CIA review board to recommend 
the dismissals of a former division chief and a station chief, as well as the 
demotion or discipline of ten other officers.187  In sum, the IG report 
prompted DCI John M. Deutch to pledge a broad implementation of the 
 
ordered the inspectors general of the Departments of Justice, State, and Defense to look into 
the matter). 
 183. Tim Weiner, More Is Told About C.I.A. in Guatemala, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1995, 
at A6. 
 184. Id.  In May 1994, within a month of receiving a tip from the station’s deputy chief 
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alert the U.S. ambassador of a plot by Guatemalan military officers to spread lies about her 
personal life. 
 185. Tim Weiner, C.I.A. May Dismiss Chief Officer Involved in Guatemala, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 28, 1995, at A3. One source said that the discipline was the most severe 
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 186. Tim Weiner, C.I.A. Says Agents Deceived Superiors on Guatemala Role, N.Y. 
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violated, unnamed senior CIA officials said that the incidents in Guatemala violated the 
CIA’s standards of professionalism and judgment.  Weiner, Hazy Tie, supra note 181.  The 
IG report also criticized CIA officers for continuing to pay Alpirez as an informant, even 
after allegations surrounding the killings.  Weiner, Deceived Superiors, supra note 186. 
 187. Weiner, supra note 185.  The two recommended for dismissal were Terry Ward, 
chief of covert operations in Latin America from 1990-1993, and Frederick Brugger, 
Guatemalan station chief from 1991-1993.  Id.  The IG report faulted Ward for not managing 
difficult personal issues in the Guatemala station, while Brugger was singled out for failing 
to notify the CIA, State Department, or Congress that Alpirez, a “prime suspect” in the 
killings, was being paid as a CIA agent.  Id. 
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report’s recommendations, including: (1) full reporting of human-rights 
abuses by CIA assets; (2) tougher standards for selecting and maintaining 
station chiefs and assets;188 and (3) full reporting by a station chief to the 
ambassador.189 
After 9/11, some critics focused on the supposed “asset scrubs” as 
evidence that the CIA had become too squeamish in conducting the dirty 
business of espionage.  Operational guidelines were changed or interpreted 
to adjust to the catastrophic threat of international terrorism.  In any event, 
on the Guatemalan investigation, the IG followed a pattern of reacting to 
abuses and the perceptions of abuses. 
With more time and resources, the IG might do better in preventing 
abuses; a proactive mode could be added to a reactive mode.  So as the 
Obama administration reacts to abuses and perceptions of abuses, it seems 
only a matter of time before more recommendations are made about checks 
and balances at CIA. 
3.  CIA-Contra Drug Links 
The IG is just as likely to react to allegations from the press as to 
formal referrals from Congress or the President.  Many allegations in the 
media related to the CIA’s role in Central America during the Reagan 
administration.  In August 1996, Gary Webb of the San Jose Mercury News 
wrote three articles known as the “Dark Alliance” series, in which he linked 
the CIA to cocaine distribution in Los Angeles during the 1980s.190  Webb 
claimed that a South-Central Los Angeles drug dealer introduced crack to 
several American cities with assistance from the CIA-backed Nicaraguan 
Contra army, who, in turn, were using a Colombian pipeline and drug 
profits to finance their war against the Sandinista government in 
Nicaragua.191  Accusing the Contras of triggering a “crack explosion in 
urban America,” Webb claimed that the CIA hampered the investigations of 
 
 188. Of the paid informants who tipped off the CIA about the Alpirez incidents, only 
one in ten had been tested and found reliable; half were never checked in any way.  Weiner, 
Hazy Tie, supra note 181. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See Gary Webb, ‘Crack’ Plague’s Roots Are in Nicaragua War, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS (Cal.), Aug. 18, 1996, at A1 [hereinafter Webb, Plague Roots]; Gary Webb, 
Odd Trio Created Mass Market for ‘Crack,’ SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Cal.), Aug. 19, 
1996, at A1; Gary Webb, War on Drugs’ Unequal Impact on U.S. Blacks, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS (Cal.), Aug. 20, 1996, at A1.  The three articles above comprise the “Dark 
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articles). 
 191. Webb, Plague Roots, supra note 190. 
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two principal players in the crack network and approved of the Contras’ 
drug dealing to accomplish their goals.192 
Webb’s articles caused civil rights groups and black members of 
Congress to complain.  DCI Deutch, looking for political cover, informed 
the Senate Select Intelligence Committee in September 1996 that OIG 
would investigate Webb’s claims in “a forthright and complete manner.”193  
Webb’s claims, though captivating, were short on facts.  To exonerate the 
CIA, OIG had the unenviable task of proving a negative.  In November 
1996, an initial investigation by IG Frederick Hitz found “no credible 
information” that the Contras were engaged in drug trafficking with the 
federal government’s knowledge.194  And in January 1998, after further 
investigation, Hitz released a report that dismissed Webb’s charges 
altogether.195  These reports, however, did not put an end to the urban 
legends. 
For additional cover, DCI Deutch asked IG Hitz to pursue a broader 
investigation of the connections between the Contras and drug trafficking.196  
This broader investigation resulted in a 500-page volume on the working 
relationship between the CIA and the Contras.197  OIG criticized CIA 
supervisors for a fitful and sloppy investigation into allegations that 
approximately two dozen CIA-affiliated Contras were involved in drug 
trafficking.198  These criticisms support the notion that the operations 
division needs external checks and other internal checks.  The OIG report 
also faulted the CIA for failures to inform; in particular, the Agency failed 
to inform Congress and the Justice Department of numerous allegations that 
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the Contras were linked to drug trafficking – allegations that emerged 
shortly after the Contra forces were created.199 
4.  September 11 Terrorist Attacks 
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 show the price Americans 
pay when their intelligence agencies fail them.  American intelligence 
agencies received information in June 2001 that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 
– a Kuwaiti terrorist already under indictment for a 1996 plot to blow up 
American passenger jets over the Pacific – was involved in sending 
terrorists to America.200  They later linked Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to 
plans to use aircraft as instruments of destruction.201  Just before the 
September attacks, the CIA and FBI failed to coordinate on counterterrorist 
operations, first, regarding two plotters who were based in San Diego after 
attending a “terrorism summit” in Malaysia,202 and again when Zacarias 
Moussaoui, a would-be plotter, was captured in Minneapolis.203  Even 
though the CIA had ample warnings at a time it purported to be “at war” 
with al Qaeda,204 it was caught flat-footed on that sunny Tuesday morning 
when al Qaeda converted four jetliners into guided missiles against 
American targets. 
Following this intelligence failure on the scale of Pearl Harbor, OIG 
was not so critical about 9/11.205  Two other investigations received more 
attention – a joint congressional inquiry and the independent 9/11 
commission.  The joint inquiry, building on internal checks, sought OIG 
reports from the CIA and FBI to determine “whether and to what extent 
personnel at all levels should be held accountable” for the failures that led 
to the attacks.206  One investigation built on another. 
More personal than other investigations, the CIA’s IG focused on a 
small group of officials, including former DCI George Tenet,207 former 
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deputy director of operations James Pavitt, and former director of the CIA’s 
Counterterrorist Center, J. Cofer Black.208  Tenet, for one, struck back both 
in his memoirs and in public appearances.209  Tenet, more than Pavitt or 
Black, was fighting for his legacy.  While Congress had specifically asked 
the IG to determine “to what extent personnel . . . should be held 
accountable,” the report did not propose any specific actions.  Instead, the 
recipient of the report, DCIA Porter Goss, was called to assemble 
“accountability boards” within the CIA’s clandestine service.210  Although 
many lives had been lost on 9/11, no careers at CIA were ruined.  Rather, 
an agency that drifted after the fall of the Soviet Union gained a sense of 
self – and fists full of dollars in new funding. 
It was a miracle that the IG report saw the light of day.  When OIG 
finally released its report about 9/11, nearly three years had passed since 
Congress requested it.211  In September 2004, IG John Helgerson submitted 
a draft to acting DCI John McLaughlin, who returned the draft to Helgerson 
with a request for more information.212  Then, in October 2004, a month 
after Goss took office, the DCIA blocked distribution of a draft.213  In 
addition, Goss asked OIG to avoid any conclusions about individual 
accountability.214  In August 2005, DCIA Goss finally presented the OIG 
report to Congress.215  Though several senior CIA officials were specifically 
named, the report was kept classified, and the only names publicized came 
through leaks.216  All in all, given OIG’s limited powers, current officials 
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had more to fear than former officials – and current ones did not have much 
to fear. 
5.  Mistreatment of Detainees 
After September 11, not many agencies stepped forward to do the dirty 
work.  That left the CIA to work the alleys and the caves in the global 
struggle against terror.  Since then, there have been reports that CIA 
personnel mistreated detainees by going farther than approved interrogation 
and detention procedures.  In two separate incidents in November 2003, 
CIA personnel were linked to the death of an Iraqi citizen under 
interrogation at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq217 and the death of an Iraqi 
general suffocated in a sleeping bag.218  When the abuses by military police 
at Abu Ghraib were displayed worldwide, it was also revealed that the CIA 
had persuaded military personnel to hold some detainees as “ghost 
prisoners” outside the prison’s standard intake.219 
Although government classification obscures a complete picture, 
several clues exist into OIG’s investigations of detainee treatment.  One 
investigation, started with the CIA’s involvement at Abu Ghraib, expanded 
into the CIA’s interrogations at other Iraqi facilities.220  In 2005, additional 
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inquiries were initiated as to abuse of detainees in Afghanistan,221 the 
extraordinary rendition of suspected terrorists,222 and the CIA’s use of secret 
detention sites throughout the world.223 
A 2004 IG report – a redacted draft of the report was released in 2008, 
and further details were released in August 2009 – expressed deep concerns 
about the CIA’s interrogation techniques.224 John Helgerson, noting the 
intermediate standard of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, 
challenged CIA and Justice Department lawyers who concluded that the 
interrogation techniques were acceptable as long as they did not cross the 
line into torture.  He also reminded them of the effects of combining certain 
techniques.  This legal challenge actually came from a non-lawyer.  The IG 
made ten recommendations, several of which the Agency applied in later 
interrogations.225 
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Years later, after The New York Times broke the story in December 
2007, OIG assisted the FBI and the Justice Department in their initial 
investigation of the destruction of videotapes of aggressive interrogations 
conducted on two high-level suspects.  This investigation, converted into a 
full criminal inquiry, is now the exclusive domain of John Durham, a career 
prosecutor. 
At the CIA, the rank and file have waited to see whether the Justice 
Department will dig deeper into these cases under President Obama and 
whether congressional committees will hold hearings about renditions, 
aggressive interrogations, and black sites.  OIG could prompt the Justice 
Department and Congress.  Or, inquiries from the Justice Department and 
Congress could cause OIG not only to expand its investigations, but to open 
new ones.  Between external and internal guards over the intelligence 
community, the effects are often mutual. 
VI.  SYNTHESIS 
A.  Is Internal Oversight Effective? 
By now, we have presented a host of questions about the CIA’s OIG.  
Has OIG lived up to its intended purposes and Congress’s expectations?226  
Has OIG conducted its investigations and inspections of CIA programs 
effectively?  Has OIG provided leadership in promoting efficiency and 
ferreting out fraud?  Has OIG kept the DCIA and the congressional 
intelligence committees sufficiently informed about the CIA’s inner 
dealings?  From the major investigations, our tentative conclusion is that 
OIG’s effectiveness depends, in large part, on the size and severity of the 
problem being investigated. 
OIG has generally produced better results when addressing discrete, 
isolated problems.  For example, the investigation of the Guatemalan 
station was very successful for OIG.  The IG report on the CIA’s activities 
in Guatemala was harshly critical of the way that several CIA officers 
conducted operations.  The harsh language helped convince an internal CIA 
review board to dismiss several officers from the CIA, and led to pledges of 
major changes in operations from then-DCI Deutch.227  In providing 
recommendations to improve effectiveness and efficiency, and by 
informing both the DCI and the congressional intelligence committees of 
significant deficiencies in the Guatemalan station, the investigation proved 
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a veritable slam dunk for OIG.228  The Guatemalan case stands as an OIG 
success story because the remedies took the form of something more than 
just words in a report. 
But OIG’s success in the Guatemalan case stands in contrast to the 
minor impact from the investigations of Aldrich Ames, the Contra-cocaine 
connection, and 9/11.229  In those cases, OIG identified either major lapses 
in protocol, serious failures of execution, or both.  Yet the IG offered few 
suggestions for meaningful discipline. In many instances, the CIA’s failures 
were errors of commission, rather than mere omissions.230  In each case, the 
DCIA did not go beyond the recommendations from either the IG or the 
review boards.  In the end, the DCIA dispensed little in the way of 
discipline.  While it is impossible to know how the DCIA would have 
reacted to more punitive proposals from the IG, it stands to reason that a 
more aggressive IG would have provided the DCIA with cover.  We do not 
intend to measure the IG’s effectiveness by the severity of its actions – that 
is, the more dismissals the better.  Instead, we merely believe that the IG 
should be the one place willing to recommend tough measures when they 
are appropriate. 
Both the IG and congressional investigations into Ames found that the 
lack of cooperation between the CIA and the FBI was part of the reason 
Ames evaded capture for so long.231  But afterward, things did not appear to 
improve.  During the post-9/11 investigations, it was apparent once more 
that a contributing factor in the failure to detect or prevent the attacks was 
the CIA’s lack of effective communication with the FBI.  Those who 
contributed to the Ames disaster, after all, were not held accountable when 
they allowed a catastrophe on September 11. 
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Therefore, discussion of the detainee investigations will largely be confined to supra Part 
V.A.2.e. 
 230. For example, while the IG found that a number of the CIA officers were aware of 
allegations of connections between the contras and drug trafficking, they chose to ignore the 
significance of those allegations.  See supra Part V.A.2.c.  Similarly, while many or most of 
Ames’s supervisors were aware of his abject failings as an employee, they chose to promote 
him nonetheless.  See supra Part V.A.2.a. 
 231. See also David M. Crane, Divided We Stand: Counterintelligence Coordination 
Within the Intelligence Community of the United States, ARMY LAW., Dec. 1995, at 26 
(providing additional perspective, in advance of 9/11, on the structural problems that 
plagued the FBI and CIA in their counterespionage activities). 
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Echoes of the Ames case emanated from the 2008 wire fraud conviction 
of former CIA Executive Director, Kyle “Dusty” Foggo.  Despite a 
personnel record that noted his “very liberal and self-serving position 
regarding the interpretation of Agency rules and regulations,” a former 
supervisor who considered him “morally suspect,” and suspicions from 
multiple parties about contractor dealings that eventually proved his 
undoing, Foggo rose to the number three position in the CIA.232  While the 
CIA supported the prosecution once in motion, the investigation of Foggo 
was an offshoot of a U.S. Attorney’s public corruption investigation of 
bribery involving Congressman Randy “Duke” Cunningham.233  Again, 
internal observers turned a blind eye as a questionable character moved up 
the Agency ladder. An external check cleaned up matters on its own. 
OIG’s reaction to the Guatemalan incident, by contrast, was precisely 
what one would expect from a body tasked with enhancing effectiveness 
and with ferreting out fraud.  The Guatemalan incident, however, was easy 
for OIG; it involved low-profile officers who had clearly violated 
operational guidelines.  Although potentially emblematic of other problems 
at the CIA, it was addressed largely in isolation.234  Moreover, the IG’s 
actions on the Guatemalan incident were quite similar to those of the non-
statutory IGs in the cases of the Bay of Pigs and the Nicaraguan guerrilla 
manual.  As such, it is difficult to argue that the IG’s statutory powers 
enhanced its effectiveness. 
The CIA’s failures on Ames and on the 9/11 attacks differed from those 
on Guatemala.  Ames and 9/11 were systemic failures with catastrophic 
consequences.  They could not be dismissed by tossing out a bad officer or 
two; these were moments that left the CIA exposed like an emperor without 
any clothes.  And yet, when presented with an opportunity to identify the 
sources of these problems, to offer remedies for mistakes, and to present 
solutions for the future, the IG reports were far less aggressive than in the 
 
 232. R. Jeffrey Smith, Files Unsealed Before Sentencing Detail Rule-Breaker’s Rise at 
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 233. Id.; Joby Warrick, Ex-CIA Official Indicted Over Agency Job for Mistress, WASH. 
POST, May 22, 2008, at A9. 
 234. OIG’s 2008 report of a botched drug interdiction in 2001 illustrates OIG’s limited 
powers even in “isolated” incidents.  The Peruvian military, operating with the aid of CIA spotters 
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aftermath of the investigations into Guatemala, the Nicaraguan manual, or 
the Bay of Pigs.  When the largest problems surfaced, the statutory OIG did 
not add significant remedial value. 
B.  Would Things Be Different Under a Non-Statutory IG? 
Our sense is that things would not have been much different after 1990 
if CIA still had a non-statutory IG.  The “independent watchdog” of a 
statutory IG did not expose major shortcomings that otherwise would have 
gone unnoticed.  Nor did the watchdog play a major role in deterring 
institutional sloth and excess.  In certain cases, however, the IG asserted 
independence that might not have been possible without Section 403q.  
Again, the results for the statutory IG may charitably be described as 
“mixed.” 
1.  Protection of Whistleblowers 
The statutory IG is supposed to draw on information from within the 
CIA and to protect whistleblowers from retaliation.  But of the five major 
IG investigations we have discussed, it does not appear that OIG was first 
to uncover any of the underlying incidents.  Representative Torricelli’s 
statements about the Guatemalan incidents were so public they required 
OIG’s participation; the attacks on 9/11 happened before the nation’s eyes; 
and the Ames arrest made instant headlines.  Most troubling for the promise 
of an internal check was that the press broke the stories about the Contra-
cocaine connection and the allegations of detainee mistreatment.  In these 
cases, the reporters were ahead of OIG either because their own research 
was better or because their sources were superior to OIG’s.  Perhaps 
whistleblowers trusted the media as a better way of exposing abuses.  Or 
perhaps whistleblowers supplemented OIG contacts with calls to reporters. 
Former IG Frederick Hitz, in describing OIG’s sources, said, “If the 
press can find sources, the [OIG] will have sources.”235  Hitz aside, when it 
was Dana Priest who broke The Washington Post story about secret CIA 
prisons – prisons that OIG had not investigated before the story – it leads to 
the conclusion that intelligence insiders deem Ms. Priest (or Mr. Risen, or 
Mr. Lichtblau, or Mr. Pincus, or any other investigative reporter) a more 
effective agent of change than OIG.236  And not only did the whistleblower 
 
 235. Interview with Frederick P. Hitz, supra note 68. 
 236. See Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 
2, 2005, at A1.  Besides Ms. Priest’s article about secret prisons in Eastern Europe, several 
other controversial intelligence programs – both inside and outside the CIA – were revealed 
first by investigative reporters; these programs included the National Security Agency’s 
warrantless monitoring and the Justice Department’s “torture memo,” which instructed CIA 
interrogators of the allowable limits of physical or mental coercion.  See James Risen & Eric 
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choose Ms. Priest either instead of, or in addition to, OIG, he or she did so 
despite the risk of being disciplined, discharged, or even arrested for 
disclosing secrets to a reporter.  There could be many reasons why CIA 
whistleblowers place greater trust in the media than OIG.  John le Carré, a 
master spy novelist and a former British intelligence officer, indirectly 
suggests one: 
I think that people who take refuge in secrecy are terrified of 
having it violated.  It may be pretty bad if the Russians find out 
about it, but it’s terrible if the press finds out about it.  I don’t think 
many spies expect not to have their names in the files of the 
opposition.  But the idea of having their faces in the newspaper – 
that’s something they wake up and sweat about in the middle of the 
night because there, somehow their identity and their security are 
being taken away from them.237 
CIA whistleblowers may feel that taking their issues to the press is not 
only faster, but serves as greater punishment of the alleged violators.  Alas, 
if OIG’s reputation within the Agency is so low that people risk prosecution 
rather than merely report their concerns to the authorized internal guard, it 
becomes questionable whether the statutory IG functions any better, or 
differently, from the non-statutory IG. 
2.  OIG’s Independence from the DCIA 
OIG’s record for independence, however, appears to be better than its 
record for ferreting out major problems on its own.  The Contra-cocaine 
investigation began when IG Hitz asserted his independence from DCI 
Deutch.238  The ensuing IG investigation into the “Dark Alliance” at first 
disproved the story’s allegations, but later uncovered several instances of 
CIA officers not paying sufficient attention to links between the Contras 
and drug traffickers.  Yet even in these cases where OIG has asserted its 
independence, there is little evidence of any formal discipline or 
institutional change. 
The IG’s reports about detainee mistreatment also demonstrated OIG’s 
independence.  At first, DCIA Goss’s unwillingness to adopt all the IG’s 
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recommendations on interrogations appeared to undercut the IG.  But once 
CIA management broke with the IG, the IG communicated his 
recommendations to the congressional intelligence committees.  That report 
to the Hill increased the scrutiny of Goss for not making changes.  Thus, 
without the IG’s independence from the DCIA, or an ability to report out to 
Congress, a policy debate between the executive and legislative branches 
may never have occurred. 
These two examples of IG independence are counterbalanced by the 
IG’s hesitation in releasing its 9/11 report.  The IG’s initial report on the 
Contra-cocaine allegations was completed in less than two months;239 the 
entire OIG investigation into the Ames case was completed in eight 
months;240 but, for political reasons, it took OIG nearly three years to release 
its 9/11 report.  Pressure from DCIA Goss regarding the structure and the 
findings of the 9/11 report contributed almost a year of delay.  That delay, 
despite constant congressional pressure to release the report, tarnished the 
IG’s reputation for independence.  The IG also bowed to pressure from the 
DCIA in omitting any advice about discipline, even though Congress had 
specifically tasked the IG to determine the extent to which personnel should 
be held accountable for the Agency’s failures.  In all, the response from 
senior CIA officers to the IG’s 9/11 report is reminiscent of the Bay of Pigs 
IG report being placed under lock and key for thirty-seven years.  CIA 
management disagreed with, and then ignored, what OIG had to say. 
As noted, DCIA Hayden was more assertive than Goss toward OIG.  
Hayden asked Robert Dietz to review its activities.241  In effect, a guard was 
placed on the guardian.  Dietz, part of Hayden’s staff at CIA, had served 
General Hayden as General Counsel at the National Security Agency.242  
CIA officers were upset because they believed that OIG had ceased acting 
as an impartial judge, and had instead begun a “crusade” against 
participants in controversial CIA programs.243  They viewed Hayden’s 
actions as restoring balance to the CIA.  Former IG Hitz was not as 
sanguine.244 
After Hayden’s review, the IG agreed to make some changes.  Officers 
would be given more details about interviews with OIG and more of an 
opportunity to comment on reports before they became final.  The result, a 
contrite IG, was a victory for the operators and a loss for the IG.  It remains 
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 240. Shane, supra note 211. 
 241. See Mazzetti & Shane, supra note 133. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
290 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY  [Vol. 4:247 
to be seen whether DCIA Panetta, under President Obama, will keep these 
changes in place. 
While OIG has shown glimpses of its true potential, incidents such as 
the struggle over the 9/11 IG report and the Hayden investigation diminish 
its successes.  Unless OIG creates and fosters a reputation for independence 
across time and circumstances, no one will take it seriously.  In a downward 
cycle, OIG is less likely to attain the independence Congress intended for it. 
3.  Is OIG Effective at Deterring Future Violations? 
Aside from actively uncovering and investigating Agency misconduct, 
another role for OIG is as a deterrent.  Section 403q was supposed to create 
a new sheriff at the Agency – a Marshal Will Kane who would take down 
the Frank Millers of the CIA before eventually riding into the sunset with 
Grace Kelly.245  The mere presence of a sheriff should make people within 
the CIA think twice about violating the law.  Congress created the statutory 
IG just after Iran-Contra to check against other large-scale violations and 
failures.246  The CIA’s IG differs from other federal IGs in patrolling an 
agency that operates in the shadows, in trying to prevent mistakes that can 
easily lead to deaths and conflicts with other countries.  The CIA’s IG 
differs from the Department of Education’s in that the missions at the two 
agencies are so different.  Even so, the same things that undercut 
effectiveness and independence in most agencies tend to lessen the IG’s 
deterrent force at the CIA.  Many CIA operators believe, in basic terms, that 
they can get past the sheriff. 
In criticizing the IG’s performance, we continue to be mindful of our 
limited data.  Our sampling, taken from fewer than ten public incidents, 
does not really explain the IG’s role in ferreting out fraud and waste.  
Instead, our conclusions come from major investigations.  The limited 
number of these investigations may actually be used to argue that the IG 
functions well, that these are the only glitches in the smooth operations of 
the CIA.  Our sense, however, is that many other failures exist that do not 
make the headlines.  For us and for other critics, it is very difficult to know 
what occurs out of the public eye.  Only through reasoned speculation can 
we see through the veil of secrecy. 
The media’s lead in uncovering the CIA’s link to drug-running Contras 
or the existence of black sites also diminishes OIG’s reputation.  Even 
before a statutory IG was created, CIA officers factored into their equation 
that illegal operations could be exposed on the front page of the newspaper, 
exposure that could take them to jail.  To have a true guard over the 
guardians, CIA officers need to believe that the statutory IG increases the 
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 246. See supra Part V. 
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risk of exposure.  The record is mixed, however.  The Guatemalan incident 
resulted in more severe discipline than might have occurred before the 
statutory IG.247  The statutory IG has yet to strike with similar force against 
counterterrorism excesses from the Bush era.248 
The CIA’s treatment of detainees also provides insights.  A statutory 
IG, by itself, did not deter the CIA from interrogating through Palestinian 
hangings.249  In fact, CIA management apparently felt that any concerns 
about oversight, involving OIG or otherwise, could be addressed by 
permissive Justice Department memos, including the infamous “torture” 
memo of August 2002.250  Since the CIA sidestepped OIG and did not 
change course until long after OIG expressed concerns about aggressive 
interrogations,251 it can be argued that OIG did not deter Agency abuses.  
The IG investigations, however, may be part of the explanation why 
waterboarding did not continue after 2003. 
The IG’s cumulative effect, on interrogations or otherwise, is difficult 
to measure.  The IG’s challenge to the Justice Department’s legal analysis, 
for sure, must have flustered the CIA’s management.  That challenge 
chipped away at a potential defense, for officers and management alike, of a 
reasonable reliance on the advice of counsel. 
All along, we have been candid about the difficulties in assessing the 
IG’s effect on the broader institution at the CIA.  We have recognized that 
audits and inspections do not make it to the public record.  Our analysis of 
the statutory IG requires conjecture about how many violations were not 
being committed as a result of the IG’s presence.  In sum, the major 
investigations only tell part of the story.  Yet it appears that OIG has been 
undercut by an inability to obtain information and to act with total 
independence.  So the rank and file, going forward, need to become more 
willing to bring their concerns to the IG instead of investigative reporters.  
Otherwise, OIG will be nothing more than expensive and elaborate window 
dressing. 
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CONCLUSION 
Today, the need for internal oversight on the CIA – and the rest of the 
American intelligence community – is just as great as it was after Iran-
Contra, and probably greater.  The CIA must be tethered to American 
foreign policy, secret or open, and must comply with guidelines that come 
from executive orders, statutes, and the Constitution.  The threats our 
country faces loom as large as the Soviet menace during the Iran-Contra 
years.  These new threats increase the need for an effective CIA, and the 
likelihood that CIA officers or their managers will try to meet those threats 
at any cost.  Oliver North, we are sure, will not be the last person to justify 
wrongdoing by love of country.  Frightened by the potential of catastrophic 
attacks by al Qaeda, North Korea, or other enemies, CIA officers may go to 
greater lengths than trading arms for hostages.  And so repeated through 
history is the question about OIG’s role in keeping CIA officers honest and 
competent. 
OIG is a major strand in a network that keeps the CIA from falling into 
the void.  On paper, the IG seems to have all that is necessary to serve as an 
effective check against CIA shortcomings.  When OIG sees trouble within 
the CIA, the IG may initiate an investigation, even over the DCIA’s 
protests.  Nearly all IG reports find their way to the intelligence committees 
in Congress, and the IG may approach Congress any time a dispute arises 
between the IG and the DCIA.  Since only the President may appoint or 
remove the IG, the DCIA no longer has full control over the person charged 
with CIA oversight.  The IG, straddled between two branches, has enough 
independence to do the job. 
Because we have not seen great improvements in the IG’s performance 
on major investigations after the IG was placed on a statutory foundation, 
we are not very inclined to offer recommendations for changes to 
institutional structures.  But, depending on the identified deficiency, 
institutional changes can be made.  Though IGs across the federal 
government are supposed to be insulated from political pressure and 
influence, President Obama’s controversial discharge of the IG of the 
Corporation for Community and National Service in June 2009 illustrated 
the peril that may await IGs who run afoul of the executive branch.252  To 
enhance the IG’s independence, for example, the IG statute could be 
changed to state a term of service that goes beyond the election cycle.  The 
Director of the FBI, as a model, is appointed for a ten-year term, part of the 
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explanation why Robert Mueller has served both Presidents Bush and 
Obama. 
Another example of institutional reform would be to require that a 
stated percentage of the IG’s staff not have prior service of any kind in the 
CIA.  By including more outsiders in the IG’s office, we could decrease the 
chances that the internal guard becomes consciously or unconsciously 
beholden to the CIA’s operators.  This statutory change might parallel the 
tradition that the CIA’s General Counsel not have prior service in the Office 
of General Counsel. 
A further option to consider is an inspector general for the entire 
intelligence community. This new community-IG could coordinate with the 
CIA’s existing IG to make sure that individual intelligence activities are 
consistent with the law and its overall goals. This extra layer of bureaucracy 
should be added only, however, if the gains in efficacy and legality 
outweigh the costs of the new position. The intelligence community, alas, 
has a tendency to pile coordinators on coordinators and layers upon layers. 
The IG, however, is only as good as the people who swear to uphold 
the duties of the office.  Oversight is not automatic, and the personal 
qualities of the IG, call him Hitz, Snider, or Helgerson, have an effect.  In 
the past, despite all the tools at their disposal, IGs have not always lived up 
to Congress’s expectations.  Reforms were needed less to statutes than to 
culture.  Though Section 403q sought to enhance the flow of information to 
the IG, the media have beaten OIG to the biggest cases.  The media’s part 
in the external guard, it seems to us, has often been stronger than OIG’s part 
in the internal guard. 
While the statutory position was supposed to foster OIG’s 
independence, the repeated delays of the IG’s 9/11 report and DCIA 
Hayden’s use of an OIG overseer reveal the DCIA’s significant sway.  Plus, 
the IG’s apparent lack of boldness in handling the most significant cases 
has undermined the office’s role.  In our view, the IG seems diminished in 
preventing and detecting misconduct at the CIA. 
Perhaps a new DCIA and a new IG, joined together, will make a 
difference for the Obama Administration.  For spymasters, inspectors 
general, and presidents, perceptions can be as important as reality.  Indeed, 
one of our central themes is that perceptions change reality.  Just so, OIG 
needs to create the impression – outside and inside the CIA – that it 
operates free from improper interference and inappropriate influence. 
One success by the IG in refusing to submit to CIA managers or to the 
White House increases the chances for the next success.  A spiral, so to 
speak, can just as easily ascend as descend.  If the IG acts forcefully against 
CIA officers who break the law, violate regulations, and perform below 
professional standards, honest and competent officers will be encouraged to 
report more things to OIG.  That, in an ascending cycle, will deter other 
officers from straying outside the lines in the first place. 
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The IG’s role becomes easier in a culture of excellence and compliance 
with the law.  The IG affects the culture in the CIA and at the same time it 
is affected by the culture.  So if OIG lives up to its potential, the media will 
have less to report, and the public might experience the pleasant sound of 
silence.  If not, external guards in the media, courts, or Congress will soon 
find themselves investigating a massive failure or an egregious abuse, 
something the internal guard failed to catch at the CIA.  One thing leads to 
another.  Even if OIG is only one lantern in the vast spaces of the CIA, 
when something is pointed in the right direction, it brings light to darkest 
night. 
 
